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RECENT DECISIONS
creased bond premiums passed on by the contractor as the cost of
doing business.
JOHN J. TONNSEN, JR.
A LANDOWNER HAS THE RIGHT TO INTERCEPT WATER PERCOLATING BE-
NEATH His LAND EVEN THOUGH IT SUPPLIES A SPRING WHICH ANOTHER
HAS APPROPRIATED.-Plaintiff owns eighty acres of farm land in the Helena
valley. In 1920, his predecessor in interest validly appropriated eighty
miners inches of water from several springs arising in the channel of Ten
Mile Creek. In 1959 the Bureau of Reclamation commenced construction
of an irrigation and drainage project in the valley, which included the con-
struction of a drain ditch that generally parallels the channel of the stream
in question. At its closest point, the ditch is about one/fourth mile from
these springs. Plaintiff contended, and the trial court found, that the con-
struction of the ditch caused the springs from which plaintiff appropriated
his irrigation water to dry up. Ten Mile Creek, with the exception of the
water supplied by these springs, is dry during the irrigation season. The
drying up of these springs, therefore, eliminated plaintiff's only source of
irrigation water. He brought suit against the United States under the
Tucker Act,' alleging the taking of a property right in violation of the
fifth amendment. Held, although the federal project caused plaintiff's
springs to dry up, under applicable Montana law governing percolating wa-
ter, that loss was Damnum absque injwria. McGowan v. United States, 206
F. Supp. 439 (D. Mont. 1962).
The Federal court in the instant case relies on the common law rule
concerning percolating water, first set out in the English case of Acton v.
Blundell,' which states that a landowner has the unqualified use of his
land. Thus he can deprive a neighbor of his percolating water supply
without liability for any injury, thereby sustained, regardless of the length
of time the neighbor has beneficially used the water. At one time, this
rule had been adopted in nearly all the western states.'
Surface water in all western states is capable of appropriation." Once
appropriated, the appropriator is protected from interference by any
person except a prior appropriator. The question presented by the instant
case is whether an appropriator should be protected from interference by
a landowner who intercepts tributary water which percoluates beneath his
land.
This paper will attempt to show that in concluding that the appro-
priator is not protected, the court has misinterpreted the applicable Mon-
128 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (2). This statute simply gives the consent of the United States
to be sued in all cases which involve constitutional issues.2152 Eng. Rep. 1223 (Ex. 1843).
8Hutchins, SELErED PROBLEMS IN THE LAW OF WATER RIGHTS IN THE WEST 156
(1942).
'Id. at 30.
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tana law in two fundamental respects: (1) in failing to differentiate be-
tween percolating water which is a tributary to a stream and percolating
water which is not, and (2) in failing to recognize that even if the com-
mon law doctrine applies in Montana,' it is applicable only in the latter
situation.
Before developing these points, it is worthwhile to examine the deci-
sions from foreign jurisdictions cited by the court in the instant case.
On page 443 the court states that if the owner of the land across which
the drainage ditch ran had dried up plaintiff's spring, there could be no
recovery. The court then cites a series of cases. Several are from eastern
states' where there is no right of appropriation. There, under the riparian
doctrine, only the landowner adjacent to the stream has any rights to the
water therein. For this reason the question presented in the instant case
is not answered by reference to these jurisdictions. Other cases cited in-
clude Gould v. Eaton' which has not been the law in California since 1902,'
and two cases from Washington," neither of which involved appropriated
water or tributaries to a stream. The Utah case cited"0 involved non-
appropriated percolating water. The court stated :'
The defendants are not seeking to appropriate water to which the
plaintiffs had previously established rights to use. If it were so,
the plaintiffs as prior appropriators would own the rights to the
use of the water and such rights would be entitled to protection.
Concerning the question here under discussion, the Utah court has
taken a position exactly opposite to the one taken in the instant case.
That court has held that "one who has appropriated the water of a spring
has also appropriated the percolating water supplying it, and has a right
to prevent the owner of adjoining land from intercepting such water
although the interception occurs on the latter's land."'
A close reading of cases from other jurisdictions will show that al-
though there is considerable support for the court's statement in those
states not recognizing the appropriation doctrine, there is little support for
it in the semi-arid western states.'
In the instant case, the court relies on the distinction between under-
ground channel water and underground percolating water," concluding
that because the water in the instant case was found to be percolating at
the point of interception, such interference did not give rise to an action-
'There has been no case decided in Montana in which the court has adjudicated a
factual situation involving an attempt to appropriate water while it is still per-
colating.6Gallerani v. U.S., 41 F. Supp. 293 (D. Mass. 1941) and United States v. Alexander,
148 U.S. 186 (1892) (arose in Dist. Col.).
'111 Cal 639, 44 Pac. 319 (1896).
sKatz v. Walkinshaw, 141 Cal. 116, 70 Pac. 663 (1902).
"Evans v. City of Seattle, 182 Wash. 450, 47 P.2d 984 (1935) ; Wilkining v. State of
Wash., 54 Wash. 2d 692, 344 P.2d 204 (1959).
'
0N. M. Long and Co. v. Cannon-Papanikolas Constr. Co., 9 Utah 2d 307, 343 P.2d 1100
(1959).
"343 P.2d at 1102.
'Peterson v. Wood, 71 Utah 79, 262 Pac. 828 (1927), as summarized in 109 A.L.R. 409.
'
0For a state by state summary of western percolating water law see supra note 3
at 182-265. For a list of recent legislative action see 22 MONT. L. REv. 50 (1960).
"Instant case at 442.
[Vol. 24,
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able injury. Montana courts have not recognized this distinction in those
cases where the percolating water is found, as it was in the instant case,
to be a tributary to a stream. The decision considered by the court as
controlling in the instant case is Ryan v. Quinlan.' Plaintiff, in that
case, found himself without sufficient water to irrigate his land by virtue
of a previous adjudication which had determined that plaintiff's appro-
priation from Dempsey Creek in Deer Lodge County was inferior to those
of prior appropriators. In an attempt to increase his water supply, he
constructed a headgate on Blind Lake, situated above the Dempsey Creek
canyon, and conducted water to his land from a small rivulet which ran
from the lake toward Dempsey Creek until it disappeared into the ground
some 3000 feet from it. Defendant objected to the use of this water, contend-
ing the rivulet was a tributary to Dempsey Creek and hence part of his ap-
propriated water. The Montana Supreme Court held for the plaintiff
because there was no showing that the water from Blind Lake reached
the creek. It refused to answer the question as to the right of the parties
had there been proof the water did reach the creek saying,"8 "The condition
in which this case reached this court, however, does not require the an-
nouncement of any definite rule." Tlhus the court, in deciding this factual
question held only that the defendant did not prove the rivulet was a
tributary to Dempsey Creek. However, in dictum, the court stated :'
The secret, changeable, and uncontrollable character of un-
derground water in its operations is so diverse and uncertain that
we cannot well subject it to the regulations of law, nor build upon
it a system of rules, as is done in the case of surface streams.
... We think the practical uncertainties which must ever attend
subterranean waters is reason enough why it should not be at-
tempted to subject them to certain and fixed rules of law, and
that it is better to leave them to be enjoyed absolutely by the own-
er of the land as one of its natural advantages, and in the eyes of
the law a part of it; and we think we are warranted in this view
by well considered cases.
This statement, that underground water should not be subject to any
rules is contrary to the settled policy of the Montana court concerning the
use and development of water in this state. In Allen v. Petrick' the court
stated :'
The use of water in Montana is vital to the prosperity of our peo-
ple. Its use, even by an individual, to irrigate a farm, is so much
a contributing factor to the welfare of the state that the people in
adopting the Constitution declared it to be a public use.
The instant case shows that the development and use of water is not
facilitated by allowing interference with stream water which has been
appropriated, merely because at the place of interception the water is
percolating. If public policy favors irrigation and development of land,
'45 Mont. 521, 124 Pae. 512 (1912).
"Id. at 534, 124 Pac. at 516.
d. at 532, 124 Pac. at 515.
1869 Mont. 373, 222 Pac. 451 (1924).
"Id. at 377, 222 Pac. at 452. Accord, Anaconda Nat'l Bank v. Johnson, 75 Mont. 401,
407, 244 Pac. 141, 142 (1926) ; Donich v. Johnson, 77 Mont. 229, 239, 250 Pac. 963,
965 (1926).
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then the water necessary to that development and irrigation should be
subject to regulation and not left to the caprice of the owner of the land
under which it percolates. Public policy has been authoritatively settled;
the conclusion should logically follow. Further, many of the objections
concerning the difficulty of ascertaining the direction in which percolat-
ing water moves have been mitigated by technological developments. It
is now a relatively easy process to trace underground water through the
use of dye and radioactive materials.
The question which the instant case purportedly decides on the
authority of Ryan v. Quinlan, is expressly not decided in that case. How-
ever, in the same year, 1912, the Montana Court handed down a decision
directly in point. ' Plaintiff had appropriated sixty miners inches of
water from Spaulding Creek in Gallatin County. On the upper side of
the stream, and separated from it by dry ground, was some low lying
swampy ground owned by the defendant. To drain these marshes, de-
fendant ran a drainage ditch across the lower end of them, between the
creek and the swamps. Plaintiff brought suit, contending that the swampy
water was a tributary to the creek and thus included in his appropriation.
The court held that the burden was upon the interceptor to show that
the intercepted water did not reach the creek and in the absence of such
proof, plaintiff was entitled to the water in defendant's ditch.' Since
the only method by which the water could have reached the stream was
by percolation, the court in effect said that an appropriation of stream
water includes that water which percolates into it.
This is made more explicit in Woodward v. Perkins," again concern-
ing the water rights to Dempsey Creek. Perkins, in this case, concocted
a rather ingenious scheme to increase his supply of water necessary for
the adequate irrigation of his land. During the spring run off, he di-
verted water from the creek and conveyed it to a series of pot holes situated
on his land above the creek. This water was stored for use during the
irrigating season. However, it soon developed that the pot holes were
porous, allowing the water to seep out the bottom. Perkins, in order to
recapturo the water, ran a ditch along the bank of the stream to collect the
water. Since the land he wished to irrigate was downstream from the
pot holes, Perkins let the water back into the stream and recollected it at
the desired point, less the amount which had evaporated. Plaintiff al-
leged that this was an interference with his appropriation. At the result-
ing trial, Perkins contended that he had developed a new source of water
which was not subject to the earlier appropriation decree.' He further
contended that under applicable Montana water law, even if the water
"Spaulding v. Stone, 46 Mont. 483, 129 Pac. 327 (1912).
"The distinction between this case and the Quinlan case seems to be only one of who
bears the burden of proof. In Quinlan, the rivulet disappeared more than 3000
feet away from Dempsey Creek. At this distance it seems logical to make the
appropriator prove that the alleged tributary does in fact reach the main stream.
However, in the Spaulding case, the intercepting ditch was much closer, at one
point even crossing the main stream. At this close proximity, the burden shifts to
the interceptor to show that he is not interfering with the rights of the prior ap-
propriator.
'116 Mont. 46, 147 Pac. 1016 (1944) (2 justices dissenting).
'If a person can show he has increased the supply of a stream since the last appro-
priation, he is entitled to the increase as "developed water."
[Vol. 24,
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which he had collected in his ditch did not come from his pot holes, he
was nevertheless entitled to it as the owner of the land under which the
percolating water moved. The first contention was rejected for lack of
proof that the water collected in the ditch came from the pot holes,'" and
the second because the "ownership of land where water has its source does
not necessarily give exclusive right to such water so as to prevent others
from acquiring rights therein.' The court said :'
Seepage water which has its rise along the bed of a stream and
forms a natural accretion thereto belongs to that stream as part
of its source of supply, same as feeder springs. An appropriator
on the stream has the right to all such tributary flow even as
against the owner of the land.
Both of these cases are as significant for what is left unsaid as for
what they say. Both involve percolating water, yet this is mentioned
only in passing. Neither case attempts to decide the questions involved
by referring to the dictum in the Quinlan case. Yet both are aware of
that case. In Perkins, the dissent relies on the dicta in Ryan v. Quinlan.
The majority, although citing it for a different proposition, impliedly
rejects it by failing to recognize Perkins' second contention. Thus it
would seem that where percolating water is a proven tributary to a
stream, the common law governing percolating water is not applicable.
The Federal District Court in the McGowan case, by basing its decision
on the distinction between surface water and percolating water, would
seem to be ignoring Montana precedent. By allowing a landowner to
interfere with tributory percolating water, the court has held contra to
earlier cases.
The rule laid down by the Spaulding and Woodward cases can be
stated quite simply. By an appropriation of water from a stream, the
appropriator is protected from interference with that water by any land-
owner, across or under whose land it flows, irrespective of whether it is
surface water, underground channel water, or underground percolating
water. In all situations, the prior appropriator should be protected.
This rule is based on public policy, logic, and common sense. It gives
an element of certainty to those who wish to develop and use water for
purposes of irrigation. It is in accord with the constitutional statement
that water in this state is public and to be used by all.' It ends the rather
arbitrary common law distinction between percolating and underground
channel water, substituting a uniform law in its place, subject only to
differences in the difficulty of proof. Consequently, in the instant case,
when the court found that the construction of the drain was the cause of
drying up the springs in Ten Mile Creek,' it is submitted that the court
"This contention created repeated ltigation for the Montana Supreme Court. On
the second appeal, 119 Mont. 11, 171 P.2d 997 (1946), the court held that the earlier
case was res judicata; again 2 justices dissented. Perkins then asked for a writ
of supervisory control, which was denied without hearing. Finally, on the third
appeal, the court allowed him to introduce new evidence to prove that the water
from the pot holes was the water collected in his ditch. Perkins v. Kramer, 121
Mont. 595, 198 P.2d- 475 (1948) (Justice Adair dissenting).
'Supra note 22 at 53, 147 P.2d at 1019.
"Ibi4.MMoNT. CONsT. art. III, § 15.
"Instant case at 442.
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had answered the only question involved and should have found for the
plaintiff as a matter of law.
Although the Spaulding and Woodward cases are the only decisions
directly in point, the general rationale of protecting the prior appropriator
has been recognized many times. In Rock Creek Ditch and Flume Co. v.
Miller, the defendant had validly appropriated 120 miners inches of water
from Wyman Creek. Seepage water from plaintiff's nearby irrigation
ditch percolated into Wyman Creek, substantially increasing its flow.
Plaintiff claimed a right to this seepage water and as owner, attempted to
retake it from the creek. He made no attempt to appropriate it as de-
veloped water. A lawsuit eventually resulted in which the court relied on
the dictum in the Quinlan case for the proposition that once the water has
seeped into the soil, it becomes part of it and the former owner loses all
rights to its use. However, by protecting the defendant's appropriated
right to the percolating water, the court recognized that percolating water
can be appropriated after it has formed a channel, and once appropriated,
it is protected from interference.
In Beaverhead Canal Co. v. Dillon Electric Light and Power Co., the
court sustained the contention that if a person increases the flow of a
stream, he can appropriate the increase as developed water. The court
then continued :'
The prior appropriator of an particular quantity of water from a
stream is entitled to the use of that water. . . . To the extent of
his appropriation his supply will be measured by the water
naturally flowing in the stream . . . whether those waters be fur-
nished by the usual rain or snows . . . or by springs or seepage
which directly contributes. (Emphasis added.)
The court in the instant case cites Popham v. Hollaran,u Wills v. Mor-
ris, and the Miller"M case for the proposition that percolating water cannot
be interfered with after it has collected and formed in a channel.' The
court then adds that this water can be interfered with before it forms a chan-
nel. The factual situations in these cases only involved the question of the
validity of the appropriation and did not concern themselves with whether
recognition of an appropriation extends to the protection of a percolating
source of supply. Read in conjunction with the Spaulding and Woodward
cases, the implication is clear however, that such appropriation does pro-
tect the appropriator from interference.
The court in the instant case, concluded that if plaintiff's proposition
were carried to a logical conclusion, a landowner would be forced to con-
tinue irrigating against his wishes when his waste water contributed to a
junior appropriator's source of supply." This contention was considered
and rejected under a factual situation similar to the one contemplated by
OW Mont. 248, 17 P.2d 1074 (1932).
'34 Mont. 135, 85 Pac. 880 (1906).
"Id. at 141, 85 Pac. at 882.
' 8 4 Mont. 442, 275 Pac. 1099 (1929).
m100 Mont 514, 50 P.2d 862 (1935).86Supra note 29.
OInstant case at 444.
mIbid.
[Vol. 24,
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the court in the instant case. The court there held that the upper irrigator
was a prior appropriator and so long as he continued to control the water
he was not bound to respect the desires of a later appropriator, at least as
long as his use was beneficial and not the result of a malicious desire to
deprive his neighbor of water.'
It is submitted that the distinction drawn by the court in the instant
case is invalid under applicable Montana law as stated in earlier decisions.
The court relies on dictum from the Quinlan case which is not applicable
to the factual situation here presented; the court further ignores those cases
directly in point. A fair interpretation of the Quinlan case, and those de-
cisions which rely on it, gives rise to the sole proposition that percolating
water cannot be appropriated before it reaches a defined channel. But
once it has reached a defined channel and has, as in the instant case, been
validly appropriated, these cases are not relevant in determining if the
appropriation protects the appropriator from interference by the land own-
er. It is submitted that no extension of the Quinlan proposition to the
factual situation here presented can be justified on any rational basis.
Once the court found that the intercepted water supplied the plaintiff's
springs and hence was the source of his appropriation, it should have con-
cluded that by virtue of such appropriation the plaintiff was protected
against interference by the defendant. This protection should be granted
regardless of whether the alleged interference occurs: (1) above the ground
in the stream itself, (2) underground, where the water is in a defined chan-
nel," or (3) underground, where the water is percolating in its migration
toward the stream. By failing to realize that the Montana Supreme Court
does not recognize a distinction between propositions 2 and 3, it is submitted
that the court reached a result contrary to the law which it purported to
apply.
The rule as herein stated places a definite burden on a landowner to
exercise care in the development and use of his land. However, as applied
to water in an underground channel, this rule has long been recognized
without a similar objection. If adopted, it would place the emphasis where
it properly belongs-on proof of interference-rather than on the arbitrary
distinction between channelized and percolating water.
It is submitted that the decision in the instant case is in error and
not founded upon a correct interpretation of the Montana authority. It
is to be hoped that the Montana Supreme Court will not follow the Federal
District Court but will, when the question is properly presented, decide
that a person is entitled to be protected against interference with his ap-
propriation of underground percolating water, where such water is found
to be a tributary to a stream.
GORHAM SWANBERG
"Newton v. Weiler, 87 Mont. 164, 286 Pac. 133 (1930).
3aThe instant case seems to recognize that propositions one and two would be pro-
tected under Montana law. Instant case at 442.
19631
7
Swanberg: McGowan v. United States
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1962
